What are the causes of the growing trend of excess savings of the corporate sector in developed countries? An empirical analysis of three hypotheses. by Pérez Artica, Rodrigo et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
What are the causes of the growing trend
of excess savings of the corporate sector
in developed countries? An empirical
analysis of three hypotheses.
Rodrigo Pe´rez Artica and Leandro Brufman and Lisana
Martinez
Universidad Nacional del Sur → Departamento de Economı´a →
Instituto de Investigaciones Econo´micas y Sociales del Sur (IIESS),
Universitat Rovira-i-Virgili
June 2013
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47410/
MPRA Paper No. 47410, posted 6 June 2013 08:53 UTC
 1 
What are the causes of the growing trend of excess savings of the corporate sector in developed 
countries? An empirical analysis of three hypotheses. 
Rodrigo Pérez Artica (IIESS-UNS/Conicet)1 
Lisana Martinez (Universitat Rovira-i-Virgili) 
Leandro Brufman 
 
 
Version: June 2013 
Abstract 
 
We analyze a sample of manufacturing firms from Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and UK during the 
period 1997-2011, and find an increasing trend of excess savings (defined as the difference 
between gross saving and capital formation), and a gradual decline of gross capital formation. This 
trend is accompanied by a steady deleveraging process and a decrease in the share of operating 
assets in total assets. This process is more acute among the more credit constrained, the more 
volatile, and the less dynamic firms. 
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JEL Codes: G3, E2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Aggregated statistics of many major developed countries show that the excess of gross savings over 
capital formation in the non-financial corporate sector has been increasing at least since 2001 
onwards. According to some studies at the aggregate level (IMF, 2006, OECD, 2007), this trend in 
the excess savings of non-financial corporations (ES) could be due to several factors that have a 
positive impact on earnings and negative impact on investment, and also due to the lower 
propensity to pay dividends in recent years (Fama and French, 2001). Non-financial corporations 
utilized ES in three ways: debt reduction, cash accumulation, and mergers and acquisitions. 
 
The buildup of liquidity resulting from the ES played a role in the recent global financial crisis that 
started in 2007. For example, Pozsar (2011) shows how such liquidity helped to meet a significant 
portion of the demand for assets issued by the deregulated financial system. This demand was 
positively driven by two factors: on the one hand, the emphasis on safety and liquidity of capital by 
investment mandates, and on the other, the relative scarcity of safe assets that satisfied such 
mandates, e.g., guaranteed bank deposits and US Treasuries (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 
2010). 
 
The need for a better understanding of the ES becomes even more relevant because it is related to 
the sluggish economic recovery in developed countries. On the one hand, according to recent 
studies and data, the growing trend of the ES accelerated in 2008, partly due to the credit crunch 
set off by the financial crisis (IILS, 2011, Kahle and Stulz , 2011, Campello, Graham and Harvey, 
2011).2 On the other hand, the low corporate investment recovery since 2009 has been frequently 
mentioned as the main culprit responsible for the slow recovery in economic activity and 
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employment.3 Finally, irrespective of the current economic conditions, the relevance of the ES is 
evident when one reflects upon the growing role of the corporate sector as far as income generation 
is concerned, over the previous three decades (Ellis and Smith, 2010). 
 
Despite its importance, there have not been any studies that analyze the ES using firm-level data to 
identify what firm characteristics explain the ES observed in aggregate level studies. This paper fills 
that gap and contributes to the literature by analyzing the ES using firm-level annual accounting 
data for a sample of industrial firms in Germany, France, Italy, Japan and the UK in the period 1997-
2011. First, we formally test for the existence of a trend in the ES and its components (gross savings 
and capital formation), and show how the three applications of the ES (debt reduction, acquisitions, 
and liquidity accumulation) evolved over time. Second, we identify the factors that could explain 
the growth trend of the ES in the last fifteen years. In particular, we seek to examine the role played 
by credit constraints, volatility in the business environment, and growth in operating activities in 
shaping the observed aggregate trend. 
 
The analysis of firm-level data confirms the existence of an increasing trend of the ES for the total 
sample and for 9 of the 10 size deciles. This trend was accompanied by decline in capital formation, 
decrease in debt, and increase in the share of non-operating assets in total assets. 
 
The econometric results show that: (i) the ES is related to credit rationing problems because 
financial-constrained firms increased their ES at a significantly higher rate than the rest of the 
firms; (ii) the ES growth rate was significantly higher among companies operating in a more volatile 
operating environment; (iii) the ES growth rate was higher among those high-growth firms that 
experienced the largest slowdown; and (iv) the increasing trend of the ES and the decreasing trend 
of Gross Capital Formation is robust to alternative specifications and sets of control variables. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the database, defines the main 
variables of interest and shows some basic descriptive statistics. In Section III, we statistically test 
for the existence of a trend in the ES, and describe the evolution over time of the ES, its components 
(gross savings and capital formation), and its main applications. Section IV provides a brief 
literature review that allows us to frame the analysis and identify three main testable hypotheses 
regarding the factors driving the growth of the ES. Section V gives a detailed description of the 
methodology by which these hypotheses are tested. The results are presented in Section VI, and its 
implications are discussed in Section VII. 
 
II. Data and construction of variables 
 
To perform the firm-level analysis we assemble a dataset that includes annual accounting data for a 
set of publicly traded firms in Germany, France, Italy, Japan and the UK, since 1997 until 2011. The 
data comes from the Worldscope database. In accordance with the financial literature (Bates, 
Kahlen and Stulz, 2009, Custodio, Laureano and Ferreira, forthcoming), our database includes only 
industrial firms. The selection of industrial firms was carried out according to the variable "General 
Industry Classification", which differentiates between manufacturing, services, transport, banking, 
insurance and other financial activities. 
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Table 1 summarizes the accounting definition of the main variables used in the study. Table 2 
provides descriptive statistics of the sample for each country presenting the mean, median, 25th 
and 75th percentiles, standard deviation and number of observations (firm-years) of each of the six 
variables listed above. Table 3, meanwhile, shows the number of firms by country and year for 
which data are available for the key variable ES. 
 
III. Excess savings (ES) and their applications over time 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the variables of interest in the period from 1997 to 2011. Each 
panel of the figure shows the time series of the median and size-weighted mean (mean weighted by 
total assets) of the variables of interest. We used both weighted mean and median measures to 
illustrate that the trends detected are representative of the aggregate trends (captured by the size-
weighted mean) and that these aggregate trends are not driven by outliers (the median is less 
sensitive to the behavior of outliers). Unless otherwise noted, the description that follows refers to 
the evolution of the size-weighted average. 
 
Figure 1 displays the growing trend in excess savings for the entire sample. It is also evident that 
the ES fluctuates with the business cycle, and these fluctuations can be explained mainly by the 
cyclical variations in gross capital formation, which are greater than the cyclical variations of gross 
savings. The amplitude of the fluctuations in the ES is always greater for the size-weighted mean 
than for the median. This suggests that the ES of big companies fluctuates more than that of small 
companies. These patterns are true for any given country (see the Appendix, Figures 1A to 1E) 
In contrast to the sideways fluctuation of gross capital formation, gross savings show a steady 
increase over time that result in a positive trend in excess savings. Interestingly, when looking at 
the median trends, gross savings has a slight negative trend, and the positive trend in the ES is 
explained by the sharp negative trend in gross capital formation. This suggests that the propensity 
to generate increasing excess savings is not determined exclusively by a secular drop in investment, 
or by an unusual growth of gross savings, but by a combination of these two factors with varying 
impact across the firms sampled.  
 
Overall, our sample of firms exhibit the very same trends as those found in studies that use national 
accounting data (IMF, 2006, OECD, 2007), suggesting that our sample is representative of the 
aggregate behavior. 
 
Figure 1 also illustrated the changes in the balance sheet (stock variables) generated by the trends 
in the ES (flow variable). First, the companies in the sample experienced a sustained fall in the 
indebtedness, which declined from 70.5% to 58% of total assets. This can be explained by the 
higher availability of internal funds from the ES. In addition, the recurrence of financial crises 
during the sample period might have shifted the corporate sector preferences towards internal 
funds and away from external sources of financing. Our firm-level data thus confirms the findings of 
previous studies based on national accounting data that identify the increase of excess savings with 
a reduction of indebtedness as one of the main uses of the ES (IMF, 2006). 
 
However, the changes in the balance sheets of the sampled firms were not just limited to the capital 
structure alone; they also changed the composition of the assets held. From Figure 1, it can be 
observed that the proportion of long term non-operating assets, which includes holdings in 
affiliated companies and other similar investments, increased consistently from 14 to 22%. 
Liquidity holdings displayed little change, and even came down slightly. 
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Some comments are needed regarding the differences in size-weighted averages and medians. The 
time series of the size-weighted average and the median are greatly similar for the ES, non-
operating assets, and debt. For these series, the size-weighted average is always higher than the 
median, which seems to indicate that larger firms had consistently higher values than smaller firms. 
In contrast, median cash holdings move in a direction different from that of the size-weighted 
average. The former starts from a level much lower than the latter, and both series converge at a 
midpoint. This suggests that the cash hoarding was a priority among smaller firms compared to 
larger firms. 
 
We also tested the statistical significance of trend of ES illustrated in Figure 1 by regressing ES on a 
trend dummy in a panel model with firm and year fixed effects (two-way fixed-effects model) for 
the entire sample and for each size decile. Table 4 (Panel A) shows the results and confirms that 
there is a positive trend in the ES for the total sample and in 8 of the 10 size deciles. Panels B and C 
show the same model as in Panel A using capital formation and gross saving as dependent variables 
instead. Panel B and C provide a first hint as to the primary causes of the positive trend in ES. 
Whereas the trend in gross saving is heterogeneous across size deciles, there is a significant 
negative trend in capital formation for the entire sample and for 8 out of 10 deciles. Therefore, from 
the results in Table 4 we can conclude that there is a positive trend in the ES that is driven by a 
negative trend in gross capital formation. 
 
To test the robustness of our results, we controlled for the effects that business cycles had on these 
trends. Panels D to F replicate the same regressions as Panels A to C, but including a dummy 
variable that equals 1 during those years when the national-aggregate investment (of the country to 
which the firm belongs) suffered a contraction. Our results are robust to the inclusion of this 
control variable. The number of deciles for which ES shows a positive trend improves to 9 (Panel 
D), and the conclusions regarding the evolution of gross savings and gross capital formation remain 
the same (Panels E and F). 
 
IV. Existing literature and hypotheses building 
 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical model that specifically addresses the 
phenomenon of the ES in the corporate sector. However, there is a well-established literature in 
corporate finance related to the investment, free cash flow, and cash holdings that provides some 
insights and allows us to draw some testable hypothesis for our empirical study. Following this 
literature, we could identify three factors that are related to the ES: (i) financial constraints, (ii) 
volatility of the operating environment, and (iii) growth prospects. 
 
First, financial constraints affect financing and investment decisions. Constrained firms should 
systematically save a fraction of its cash flow to safeguard against future investment needs 
(Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004). Therefore, we should find that the ES is larger among 
financially constrained firms. 
 
Second, the ES is related to the volatility of the operating environment. Previous empirical studies 
show that increased volatility of sales, costs and earnings negatively impacted investment (Von 
Kalckreuth, 2000, using a sample of German firms, Baum et. al. using a sample of US manufacturing 
firms), while other studies have found an increase in cash ratios is concentrated among firms in 
industries that experienced the greatest increase in idiosyncratic volatility (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 
2009). Moreover, firms’ liquidity management is affected by macroeconomic uncertainty (Baum et. 
al, 2009). Irvine and Pontiff (2008) show that, over the past four decades, cash-flow volatility has 
increased due to more intense product market competition. As a result, we should find an 
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increasing trend in the ES together with larger ES among those firms facing a more volatile 
operating environment. 
 
Finally, the ES is related to growth prospects. As described by Jensen (1986, 1989) companies in 
mature and declining industries tend to have low growth, large and positive cash flow, and low 
profitable investment opportunities. Unless management is wasting cash-flow through unsound 
investment projects or paying out dividends, we should find that the ES is larger among low-growth 
firms.  
 
V. Methodology 
 
We thus have three mutually not exclusive hypotheses concerningthe factors driving the rise on the 
ES: 
 
(i) Excess savings are mainly generated by those firms facing financial constraints 
(ii) excess savings are mainly generated by those firms facing a volatile operating environment 
(iii) excess savings are caused by low-growth firms that lack profitable investment 
opportunities 
 
We test whether these hypotheses explain the positive trend in the ES from 1997 to 2011. To do 
this we estimate a two-way fixed effects model, using alternatively ES and Gross Capital Formation 
as dependent variables, and including as regressors a trend variable, variables that measure  
financial constraints, volatility of the business environment, and growth, and interaction terms 
between these variables and the trend variable. The variables that measure financial constraints, 
growth volatility, and growth, are constructed following the existing literature. The coefficients of 
the variables will determine whether the positive trend in the ES remains positive and significant 
after controlling for firm-characteristics, whether these firm-characteristics significantly explain 
the ES, and whether the positive trend in the ES is different for firms with different characteristics. 
By repeating the same set of regressions using Gross Capital Formation as a dependent variable we 
will be able to identify whether these firm-characteristics significantly affect companies’ 
investment behavior, thus driving the ES. Therefore, we will be able to link the empirical evidence 
related to the investment literature to our main topic in this paper, the excess savings. 
 
Financial constraints were captured byseven different measures: (1) Whited-Wu (2006) Index; (2) 
Kaplan-Zingales (1997) Index; (3) the natural logarithm of total assets (with smaller firms facing 
more financial constraints); (4) the square of the natural logarithm of total assets, to address the 
quadratic relationship found between firm size and rationing by Hadlock and Pierce (2010); (5) 
return over assets (with less profitable firms facing more financial constraints); (6) a dummy 
variable that identifies whether the firm pays dividends; (7) a dummy variable that identifies 
whether the firm has positive earnings4. To avoid endogeneity problems, these last three measures 
are not used when the dependent variable is Excess Savings. Volatility of the business environment 
is measured by the variation coefficient of five different variables: (1) net sales; (2) net sales 
growth; (3) Tobin’s Q5; (4) COGS to sales ratio; (5) the net earnings margin. In all the cases we 
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compute the variation coefficient using a 5-year rolling window of the standard deviation and the 
mean of each variable. Finally, we used three different variables that measure growth 
opportunities: (1) net sales growth; (2) Tobin’s Q; (3) R&D expenditures over total assets, following 
Graham (2000) and Fama and French (2002). 
 
We also included a set of control variables that capture the financial management policy of the 
firms, the level of diversification to non-core activities, and the macroeconomic environment. 
Following Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), the firms’ financial management policy was measured 
by a set of indicators such as indebtedness, short-term indebtedness, liquidity holdings, the ratio 
between short-term assets and liabilities, debt change, and short-debt change. All these indicators 
are those current at the beginning of the sample period. Ahn, Denis, and Denis (2006) argue that the 
level of firms’ diversification affect gross capital formation, and therefore ES. We thus use the ratio 
of non-operating assets to total assets at the beginning of the sample period to control for the level 
of diversification to non-core activities. Finally, the macroeconomic environment is proxied by a 
dummy variable that identifies whether aggregate national investment is growing or falling. 
The estimated model can be summarized by the following equation: 
𝑦 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝛼𝑧 + 𝛾𝑡 +  𝛿𝑡𝑧 + 𝑢 
 
where Y is alternatively ES and Gross Capital Formation, X is a vector of control variables, Z is a 
measure of either financial constraints, growth volatility, or growth as described above, and t is a 
trend variable. Our main focus of attention will be on the coefficients 𝛼, 𝛾and 𝛿. 𝛾will determine 
whether the trends identified in Table 4 are still present after controlling for firm-characteristics. 𝛼 
will inform whether the ES and Gross Capital Formation are explained by financial constraints, 
growth volatility, and growth. Finally, 𝛿 will determine whether the growing trend in ES and falling 
trend in Gross Capital Formation are different for firms with different characteristics. 
 
VI. Results 
 
Table 5 shows the effects of financial constraints on ES (Panel A) and on Gross Capital Formation 
(Panel B). The first finding is that the ES was in general smaller among financially constrained 
firms: out of the four measures of financial constraints included in Panel A, three measures support 
this finding. Even though the Kaplan-Zingales Index suggests that financial constrained firms had 
more ES, the limitations of this index to capture financial constraints are well-known (see Hadlock 
and Pierce, 2010). The secondfinding is that there is a positive trend in ES, and that this trend is 
significantly larger for financially constrained firms. Again, except for the regression using the 
Kaplan-Zingales Index, all the remaining three regressions support this conclusion.The third finding 
is that we confirm the existence of a negative trend in the Gross Capital Formation (Panel B), and 
there is some weak evidence that suggest that the trend was more negative for those firms facing 
financial constraints. Regarding the effect of financial constraints on Gross Capital Formation, the 
results in Panel B are mixed. For some specifications we find that Gross Capital Formation was 
smaller among financial constrained firms (Kaplan-Zingales, ROA, Dividends, and Earnings), but for 
others we find the opposite (Whited-Wu Index, and square of total assets). 
 
Table 6 shows the effects of the volatility of the operating environment on ES and on Gross Capital 
Formation (Panel A and B, respectively).  The first finding is that the ES was initially lower for more 
volatile firms, as shown by the negative and statistical significant coefficient for each of the five 
measures of volatility. The second finding is that we find a positive trend in ES for the entire sample 
of firms even after controlling for operating environment volatility, and furthermore,those firms 
facing a more volatile operating environment had a significant higher positive trend in ES than 
those firms in a less volatile environment. The third finding is that we confirm a negative trend in 
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the Gross Capital Formation for the entire sample, and there is some weak evidence that suggests 
that firms with a more volatile operating environment had a significant more negative trend in the 
Gross Capital Formation. Finally, there is some weak evidence that suggest firms facing a more 
volatile environment had higher Gross Capital Formation. 
 
Table 7 shows the effect of the growth opportunities on ES (Panel A) and on Gross Capital 
Formation (Panel B). First, we find that the ES was higher for low-growth firms and that Gross 
Capital Formation was lower for low-growth firms (for two out of three measures of growth 
opportunities in the case of Gross Capital Formation). Second, we find that there is a positive trend 
in ES for the entire sample, and that high-growth firms had a significant more positive trend than 
low-growth firms. Third, again we confirm the negative trend in the Gross Capital Formation for the 
entire sample, and we find that high-growth firms had a significant more negative trend in the 
Gross Capital Formation (for two out of three measures of growth opportunities).  
 
Taken all the evidence together, these results suggest a strong case for convergence on the financial 
management policy of the firms. We conclude this from the following observations: 
- First, contrary to what was expected by the literature, the ES was smaller among financially 
constrained firms. Nevertheless, financially constrained firms had a significant higher ES growth. 
Figure 2 complements Table 5 and illustrates that indeed convergence is taking place.  
- Second, as expected we did find an increasing trend in the ES, but again, contrary to what was 
expected by the literature, we find a smaller ES among those firms facing a more volatile 
operating environment. Similarly to the analysis of financial constraints, we find that those firms 
facing a more volatile operating environment had a higher rate of ES accumulation. Figure 3 
complements Table 6 and illustrates the aforementioned convergence.  
- Finally, just as expected by the literature, we find that ES is larger and Gross Capital Formation is 
smaller among low-growth firms. Nevertheless, during the period of analysis high-growth firms 
suffered a reduction of its growth, converging to low-growth firms, and consequently increased 
ES and reduced its Gross Capital Formation at a significant higher rate (Figure 4). 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
This paper provides a number of important firm-level facts on the dynamic of ES. We have shown 
that: (i) the ES is related to credit rationing problems because financial-constrained firms increased 
their ES at a significantly higher rate than the rest of the firms; (ii) the ES growth rate was 
significantly higher among companies operating in a more volatile operating environment;(iii) the 
ES growth rate was higher among those high-growth firms that experienced the largest slowdown; 
and (iv) the increasing trend of the ES and the decreasing trend of Gross Capital Formation is 
robust to alternative specifications and sets of control variables. 
 
When analyzing the cross-sectional variation of ES among firms facing financial constraints and 
volatile operating environment we find that the results are at odds with what existing literature 
would suggest, having these firms lower (instead of higher) ES. Interestingly, the ES accumulation 
trend, although positive for the entire sample, was even more positive for exactly those type of 
firms. When focusing on growth potential, the evidence is in line with the existing literature, 
showing that low-growth firms had higher ES and lower Gross Capital Formation than high-growth 
firms. Nevertheless, high-growth firms’ growth rate slowed down during the period, and therefore 
these firms reduced its Gross Capital Formation and increased its ES at a higher rate than low-
growth firms. 
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More generally, our evidence shows that during the sample period there was a significant increase 
in ES partially driven by a significant decrease in Gross Capital Formation. Additionally, our data 
shows that firms facing financial constraints, on a volatile operating environment, and that 
experienced a growth slowdown played a special role, as they reduced their Gross Capital 
Formation and increased their ES at a significant faster pace. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing 
that these trends are also present in financially non-constrained firms, in firms facing a low-
volatility operating environment, and in high-growth and low-growth firms. These results hold 
even after controlling the financial management policy of the firms, the level of diversification to 
non-core activities, and the macroeconomic environment. 
 
One of the objectives of this paper was to shed light on the nature of ES using firm-level data 
instead of national accounting aggregates. One of the main takeaways is that even though firms’ 
characteristics play a role, the phenomenon is more pervasive than initially expected. The policy 
message seems to be that although reducing financial constraints, reducing operating volatility, and 
ensuring investment opportunities for firms will certainly help, it will not solve the problem of the 
excess savings of the non-financial corporate sector, as firms not facing these challenges are still 
accumulating excess savings in their balance sheets. 
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Variable Definition
Gross Savings
Gross Capital Formation
Excess Savings
Leverage
Liquidity Holdings
Acquisitions
Table 1
Definition of Variables
This table shows the definition and construction of the main variables of interest
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
 
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + ∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡 − 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
 
∆ 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦, 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
 
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
p25 p50 p75 Nro. Obs
Total Sample
Gross Savings 2.91% 13.42% 1.66% 4.69% 7.91% 72,450        
Excess Savings -2.00% 15.11% -5.91% -0.22% 4.32% 72,450        
Gross Capital Formation 4.93% 11.29% 0.01% 4.72% 10.19% 73,687        
Leverage 54.57% 26.28% 38.06% 55.29% 70.25% 73,687        
Liquidity Holding 16.47% 15.71% 5.67% 11.88% 21.89% 73,687        
Acquisitions -3.03% 9.00% -6.15% -2.92% -0.06% 73,687        
France
Gross Savings 4.68% 10.44% 3.06% 6.23% 9.46% 7,460          
Excess Savings -2.46% 13.78% -8.29% -1.12% 4.47% 7,460          
Gross Capital Formation 7.22% 12.99% 1.40% 6.98% 13.60% 7,638          
Leverage 61.06% 23.64% 48.07% 61.11% 73.38% 7,638          
Liquidity Holding 14.41% 14.25% 4.65% 9.83% 19.13% 7,638          
Acquisitions -2.61% 9.15% -6.27% -2.93% 0.46% 7,638          
Germany
Gross Savings 3.10% 20.65% 1.72% 6.06% 9.79% 7,250          
Excess Savings -3.25% 22.31% -9.03% -1.13% 5.25% 7,250          
Gross Capital Formation 6.42% 13.98% 0.14% 6.67% 13.50% 7,649          
Leverage 57.93% 26.08% 41.71% 60.18% 73.57% 7,649          
Liquidity Holding 15.48% 18.19% 3.10% 8.57% 20.62% 7,649          
Acquisitions -4.26% 11.05% -8.04% -3.97% -0.39% 7,649          
Italy
Gross Savings 3.66% 8.88% 2.15% 4.93% 7.63% 2,701          
Excess Savings -2.58% 12.18% -7.85% -1.57% 3.62% 2,701          
Gross Capital Formation 6.37% 11.31% 1.05% 6.17% 12.25% 2,777          
Leverage 61.15% 19.59% 48.85% 62.71% 73.98% 2,777          
Liquidity Holding 11.72% 12.45% 3.92% 7.71% 14.60% 2,777          
Acquisitions -1.87% 8.88% -5.59% -2.63% 1.13% 2,777          
Japan
Gross Savings 3.52% 9.29% 1.77% 4.13% 6.72% 39,666        
Excess Savings -0.04% 10.89% -3.67% 0.50% 4.29% 39,666        
Gross Capital Formation 3.57% 9.32% -0.38% 3.69% 8.08% 40,239        
Leverage 53.18% 22.14% 36.65% 53.88% 69.76% 40,239        
Liquidity Holding 17.58% 13.72% 7.92% 13.86% 23.01% 40,239        
Acquisitions -3.07% 6.88% -5.61% -2.81% -0.41% 40,239        
United Kingdom
Gross Savings 0.25% 18.67% -1.13% 5.43% 9.49% 15,373        
Excess Savings -6.12% 19.74% -11.58% -2.19% 4.07% 15,373        
Gross Capital Formation 6.37% 12.95% 0.53% 6.09% 12.80% 15,384        
Leverage 52.12% 35.99% 34.21% 51.10% 66.04% 15,384        
Liquidity Holding 15.93% 19.65% 2.71% 8.46% 20.96% 15,384        
Acquisitions -2.73% 12.09% -7.09% -2.84% 1.54% 15,384        
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Summary of dispersion and central tendency measures for the main variables, by country.
Number of observations are firm-year observations.  p25, p50, y p75 represent the 25, 50 (median), and 75 percentiles of the 
distribution. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1.
Year France Germany Italy Japan
United 
Kingdom
Whole 
Sample
1997 494 417 141 1,128 1,173 3,356
1998 541 485 154 1,114 1,144 3,442
1999 540 530 166 1,120 1,047 3,407
2000 560 526 183 2,578 966 4,818
2001 580 591 190 2,888 1,030 5,283
2002 561 551 199 3,127 1,107 5,548
2003 555 538 198 3,119 1,127 5,540
2004 545 528 205 3,111 1,168 5,560
2005 542 530 204 3,248 1,160 5,686
2006 526 525 215 3,234 1,131 5,633
2007 506 515 211 3,236 1,119 5,589
2008 513 516 217 3,171 1,048 5,469
2009 490 507 212 3,075 1,052 5,339
2010 470 476 200 3,016 951 5,116
2011 37 15 6 2,501 150 2,710
Table 3
Number of firms by year and country
This table shows the number of firms reporting non-missing Excess Savings by year and country, as 
well as for the whole sample.
Variable Dependiente
Whole 
Sample
Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10
Panel A. Excess Savings
Trend 0.00247*** 0.0193*** 0.00235 0.00685** 0.00480*** 0.00308*** 0.00199** 0.00138* 0.000617 0.00272*** 0.00263***
(0.000261) (0.00538) (0.00285) (0.00325) (0.00162) (0.00119) (0.000809) (0.000750) (0.000878) (0.000473) (0.000265)
Constant -0.0499*** -0.266*** -0.123*** -0.0915*** -0.0705*** -0.0455*** -0.0389*** -0.0209** -0.0226* -0.0292*** -0.0232***
(0.00286) (0.0315) (0.0159) (0.0182) (0.00829) (0.00645) (0.00813) (0.0106) (0.0123) (0.00602) (0.00311)
Number of observations 72,496 2,742 4,444 5,427 6,360 7,263 6,672 8,143 9,328 10,531 11,586
R-squared 0.022 0.052 0.025 0.019 0.041 0.043 0.022 0.025 0.021 0.045 0.072
Number of firms 9,153 650 847 916 934 936 925 983 974 992 996
Panel B. Gross Capital Formation
Trend -0.00363*** -0.00518 -0.00261 -0.00764*** -0.00607*** -0.00547*** -0.00493*** -0.00292*** -0.00211*** -0.00248*** -0.00212***
(0.000197) (0.00371) (0.00220) (0.00177) (0.00150) (0.00108) (0.000672) (0.000702) (0.000545) (0.000385) (0.000256)
Constant 0.0989*** 0.154*** 0.125*** 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.129*** 0.112*** 0.0745*** 0.0696*** 0.0718*** 0.0679***
(0.00216) (0.0213) (0.0122) (0.00986) (0.00760) (0.00590) (0.00689) (0.00994) (0.00764) (0.00491) (0.00299)
Number of observations 73,733 2,836 4,598 5,559 6,473 7,364 6,900 8,328 9,426 10,613 11,636
R-squared 0.069 0.041 0.050 0.097 0.091 0.097 0.080 0.071 0.088 0.096 0.127
Number of firms 9,233 669 864 922 942 938 945 988 975 993 997
Panel C. Gross Savings
Trend -0.00106*** 0.0140*** -0.000241 -0.000610 -0.00104 -0.00199** -0.00298*** -0.00139** -0.00146* 0.000230 0.000490***
(0.000217) (0.00497) (0.00250) (0.00299) (0.00121) (0.000825) (0.000663) (0.000556) (0.000750) (0.000346) (0.000159)
Constant 0.0478*** -0.111*** -0.000221 0.0478*** 0.0651*** 0.0812*** 0.0743*** 0.0531*** 0.0469*** 0.0426*** 0.0448***
(0.00238) (0.0291) (0.0140) (0.0168) (0.00620) (0.00448) (0.00667) (0.00787) (0.0105) (0.00440) (0.00186)
Number of observations 72,496 2,742 4,444 5,427 6,360 7,263 6,672 8,143 9,328 10,531 11,586
R-squared 0.008 0.045 0.021 0.009 0.023 0.033 0.028 0.030 0.006 0.012 0.050
Number of firms 9,153 650 847 916 934 936 925 983 974 992 996
Panel D. Excess Savings
Trend 0.00300*** 0.0166*** 0.00175 0.00644* 0.00405** 0.00294** 0.00201** 0.00191** 0.00183* 0.00430*** 0.00282***
(0.000268) (0.00565) (0.00294) (0.00329) (0.00165) (0.00122) (0.000808) (0.000785) (0.00106) (0.000830) (0.000747)
Dummy Recession 0.0149*** 0.0390 0.00955 0.0106 0.0144** 0.00289 0.00318 0.0165*** 0.0210** 0.0231** 0.00271
(0.00178) (0.0250) (0.0115) (0.0131) (0.00637) (0.00499) (0.00514) (0.00615) (0.0104) (0.00996) (0.00987)
Constant -0.0575*** -0.261*** -0.122*** -0.0906*** -0.0692*** -0.0453*** -0.0390*** -0.0294*** -0.0417*** -0.0543*** -0.0262**
(0.00300) (0.0317) (0.0160) (0.0183) (0.00831) (0.00647) (0.00813) (0.0112) (0.0155) (0.0124) (0.0116)
Number of observations 72,450 2,742 4,444 5,421 6,360 7,255 6,668 8,115 9,328 10,531 11,586
R-squared 0.023 0.054 0.025 0.019 0.042 0.043 0.022 0.026 0.022 0.045 0.072
Number of firms 9,144 650 847 913 934 933 924 981 974 992 996
Panel E. Gross Capital Formation
Trend -0.00429*** -0.00448 -0.00133 -0.00708*** -0.00514*** -0.00472*** -0.00501*** -0.00353*** -0.00315*** -0.00377*** -0.00226***
(0.000202) (0.00387) (0.00226) (0.00179) (0.00153) (0.00111) (0.000672) (0.000734) (0.000661) (0.000676) (0.000720)
Dummy Recession -0.0187*** -0.0100 -0.0206** -0.0147** -0.0176*** -0.0137*** -0.0123*** -0.0184*** -0.0181*** -0.0188** -0.00194
(0.00134) (0.0159) (0.00859) (0.00700) (0.00585) (0.00458) (0.00438) (0.00576) (0.00648) (0.00812) (0.00952)
Constant 0.108*** 0.153*** 0.122*** 0.141*** 0.137*** 0.128*** 0.113*** 0.0838*** 0.0862*** 0.0922*** 0.0701***
(0.00226) (0.0214) (0.0122) (0.00986) (0.00762) (0.00592) (0.00689) (0.0105) (0.00965) (0.0101) (0.0111)
Number of observations 73,687 2,836 4,598 5,553 6,473 7,356 6,896 8,300 9,426 10,613 11,636
R-squared 0.072 0.041 0.052 0.098 0.093 0.098 0.081 0.072 0.089 0.097 0.127
Number of firms 9,224 669 864 919 942 935 944 986 975 993 997
Panel F. Gross Savings
Trend -0.00120*** 0.0119** 0.000559 -0.000347 -0.000959 -0.00141* -0.00303*** -0.00148** -0.00131 0.000541 0.000532
(0.000224) (0.00522) (0.00258) (0.00303) (0.00124) (0.000845) (0.000663) (0.000582) (0.000909) (0.000607) (0.000447)
Dummy Recession -0.00388*** 0.0306 -0.0129 -0.00711 -0.00149 -0.0104*** -0.00857** -0.00248 0.00249 0.00455 0.000600
(0.00148) (0.0231) (0.0101) (0.0120) (0.00476) (0.00346) (0.00422) (0.00456) (0.00890) (0.00728) (0.00591)
Constant 0.0498*** -0.107*** -0.00153 0.0479*** 0.0650*** 0.0799*** 0.0750*** 0.0542*** 0.0447*** 0.0377*** 0.0441***
(0.00250) (0.0293) (0.0140) (0.0168) (0.00622) (0.00449) (0.00667) (0.00831) (0.0133) (0.00904) (0.00693)
Number of observations 72,450 2,742 4,444 5,421 6,360 7,255 6,668 8,115 9,328 10,531 11,586
R-squared 0.008 0.046 0.022 0.009 0.023 0.035 0.029 0.029 0.006 0.012 0.050
Number of firms 9,144 650 847 913 934 933 924 981 974 992 996
Table 4 shows the linear trend of the main variables of interest (Excess Savings, Gross Capital Formation, and Gross Savings) in a two-way fixed-effect model with firm-specific and year-specific effects. The results are presented
for the whole sample and for every decile of size. Panels A, B, and C show the results of regressions including a constant and a linear trend only. Panels D, E, y F include a dummy variable identifying periods of economic crisis
(falling aggregate investment) in the country where the firm is based. Standard deviations are reported between brackets. *, **, ***, show significance at the 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
Table 4
Trends of the Excess Savings, Gross Savings and Gross Capital Formation, by decile of size.
Two-way fixed effects with a linear trend
Independent Variables
Trend 0.00936*** 0.00607*** 0.00414*** 0.0118*** -0.0137*** -0.00822*** -0.00312*** -0.0120*** -0.00163*** -0.00182*** -0.00223***
(0.00119) (0.000670) (0.000959) (0.00142) (0.000751) (0.000429) (0.000249) (0.00212) (0.000232) (0.000348) (0.000271)
Dummy Recession 0.00645*** 0.00641*** 0.00622*** 0.00468*** -0.0109*** -0.0109*** -0.00870*** -0.00676*** -0.0117*** -0.0138*** -0.0116***
(0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00167) (0.00160) (0.00120) (0.00120) (0.00129) (0.00127) (0.00111) (0.00119) (0.00115)
L.leverage -0.0551*** -0.0562*** -0.0964*** -0.0500*** 0.0615*** 0.0625*** 0.0531*** 0.0624*** 0.0544*** 0.0591*** 0.0587***
(0.00979) (0.00979) (0.0179) (0.0100) (0.00712) (0.00715) (0.00769) (0.00739) (0.00661) (0.00711) (0.00685)
L.clta -0.0365*** -0.0386*** -0.0382*** -0.0489*** 0.136*** 0.133*** 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.0961*** 0.129*** 0.113***
(0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0123) (0.0118) (0.00958) (0.00962) (0.00998) (0.00999) (0.00874) (0.00955) (0.00915)
L.liquidity_demand -0.343*** -0.343*** -0.330*** -0.345*** 0.319*** 0.319*** 0.316*** 0.318*** 0.308*** 0.305*** 0.301***
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0117) (0.0129) (0.00870) (0.00872) (0.00889) (0.0101) (0.00824) (0.00865) (0.00847)
L.assets_nonop -0.236*** -0.230*** -0.214*** -0.235*** 0.165*** 0.168*** 0.159*** 0.188*** 0.169*** 0.149*** 0.156***
(0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0126) (0.0120) (0.00871) (0.00871) (0.00909) (0.00916) (0.00838) (0.00848) (0.00842)
total_debt_variation -0.471*** -0.469*** -0.474*** -0.433*** 0.392*** 0.394*** 0.391*** 0.369*** 0.408*** 0.393*** 0.397***
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0134) (0.0113) (0.00932) (0.00932) (0.00970) (0.0104) (0.00873) (0.00929) (0.00900)
current_debt_variation -0.126*** -0.127*** -0.130*** -0.132*** 0.229*** 0.228*** 0.231*** 0.225*** 0.201*** 0.227*** 0.216***
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0117) (0.0106) (0.0117) (0.0112)
logAT 0.0295*** -0.000320
(0.00236) (0.00178)
logAT_t -0.000477*** 0.000735***
(6.79e-05) (4.38e-05)
logAT2 0.000972*** -0.000127**
(7.60e-05) (5.83e-05)
logAT2_t -1.61e-05*** 2.38e-05***
(2.08e-06) (1.37e-06)
KZ_index 0.0228*** -0.00287***
(0.00866) (0.00111)
KZ_index_t -0.000972 0.000324***
(0.000685) (9.82e-05)
WW_index -0.373*** 0.492***
(0.0316) (0.0440)
WW_index_t 0.0152*** -0.0160***
(0.00214) (0.00327)
roa 0.327***
(0.0204)
roa_t -0.00214
(0.00181)
pays_div 0.0104***
(0.00369)
pays_div_t -9.85e-05
(0.000338)
earns_loses 0.0409***
(0.00267)
earns_loses_t 0.000311
(0.000251)
Constant -0.335*** -0.122*** 0.0808*** -0.117*** -0.0839*** -0.0592*** -0.0700*** 0.200*** -0.0987*** -0.0907*** -0.109***
(0.0343) (0.0175) (0.0116) (0.0205) (0.0263) (0.0140) (0.00606) (0.0287) (0.00545) (0.00648) (0.00578)
Number of observations 60,589 60,589 56,915 57,769 61,422 61,422 56,920 58,465 61,422 61,422 61,422
R-squared 0.294 0.293 0.387 0.367 0.478 0.478 0.480 0.502 0.535 0.473 0.498
Number of firms 8,393 8,393 8,112 8,212 8,467 8,467 8,112 8,268 8,467 8,467 8,467
Table 5
The effect of financial constraints on the trend of Excess Savings
Fixed-effects model by firm
Each column of Table 5, reports the regression results corresponding to one meassure of financial constraints. In Panel A the dependent variable is Excess Savings, in Panel B the dependent variable is Gross Capital Formation. Each column
reports the coefficient estimates for the trend, our control variables, the measure of financial constraints and the interaction term between this measure and the trend. Our control variables are a dummy variable indicating an aggregate
contraction of private investment in the country where the firm is based during year t (Dummy Recession), total and current debt variation between the periods t and t-1, and the lagged values of the ratio of Total Liabilities/Total Assets
(leverage), the Current Liabilities/Total Assets ratio (clta), the Cash & Short Term Investment/Total Assets ratio (liquidity_demand), and the Non-Operating Assets/Total Assets ratio (assets_nonop). The measures of financial contraints
used are the natural logarithm of Total Assets (logAT), the natural logarithm of Total Assets squared (logAT2), the Kaplan and Zingales index (KZ_index), the Whited and Wu index (WW_index), the Return on Assets ratio (roa), a dummy
variable equal to one when the firm pays cash dividends, and a dummy variable equal to one when the firm reports positive net income. Standard deviation robust to clustering by firm are reported between brackets. *, **, ***, indicate
significance at the 10, 5 y 1% level respectively.
Panel A
Dependent Variable: Excess Savings
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Gross Capital Formation
Independent Variables
Trend 0.000939*** 0.00181*** 0.00155*** 0.00181*** 0.000769*** -0.000737*** -0.00191*** -0.00145*** -0.00185*** -0.000224
(0.000284) (0.000225) (0.000228) (0.000225) (0.000280) (0.000228) (0.000175) (0.000183) (0.000176) (0.000216)
Dummy Recession 0.00774*** 0.00911*** 0.00840*** 0.00868*** 0.00743*** -0.0124*** -0.0139*** -0.0115*** -0.0134*** -0.0122***
(0.00152) (0.00155) (0.00161) (0.00153) (0.00156) (0.00120) (0.00121) (0.00122) (0.00120) (0.00124)
logAT 0.0254*** 0.0263*** 0.0265*** 0.0276*** 0.0247*** 0.00382** 0.000886 -4.21e-05 0.00102 0.00286
(0.00243) (0.00235) (0.00240) (0.00237) (0.00242) (0.00185) (0.00181) (0.00187) (0.00181) (0.00177)
L.leverage -0.0516*** -0.0517*** -0.0418*** -0.0525*** -0.0521*** 0.0519*** 0.0480*** 0.0432*** 0.0504*** 0.0440***
(0.00973) (0.00978) (0.00981) (0.00964) (0.0102) (0.00712) (0.00710) (0.00700) (0.00712) (0.00742)
L.clta -0.0302*** -0.0291** -0.0376*** -0.0268** -0.0270** 0.127*** 0.123*** 0.132*** 0.126*** 0.124***
(0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.00964) (0.00964) (0.00966) (0.00963) (0.00973)
L.liquidity_demand -0.327*** -0.321*** -0.335*** -0.327*** -0.316*** 0.296*** 0.287*** 0.296*** 0.295*** 0.287***
(0.0129) (0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0135) (0.00868) (0.00878) (0.00883) (0.00877) (0.00879)
L.assets_nonop -0.221*** -0.210*** -0.236*** -0.217*** -0.214*** 0.146*** 0.135*** 0.143*** 0.141*** 0.145***
(0.0138) (0.0141) (0.0124) (0.0141) (0.0143) (0.00859) (0.00873) (0.00870) (0.00871) (0.00889)
total_debt_variation -0.472*** -0.474*** -0.472*** -0.474*** -0.472*** 0.394*** 0.394*** 0.395*** 0.396*** 0.393***
(0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.00950) (0.00966) (0.00973) (0.00959) (0.00990)
current_debt_variation -0.121*** -0.120*** -0.124*** -0.121*** -0.123*** 0.224*** 0.225*** 0.229*** 0.224*** 0.224***
(0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0120) (0.0123)
movcv_net_sales -0.0761*** 0.0967***
(0.0186) (0.0138)
movcv_net_sales_t 0.00629*** -0.00845***
(0.00179) (0.00134)
movcv_sales_growth -6.00e-06*** 2.19e-06
(1.92e-06) (2.24e-06)
movcv_sales_growth_t 3.76e-07** -8.60e-08
(1.63e-07) (1.80e-07)
movcv_cogs_sales -0.0678*** 0.00625
(0.0222) (0.0117)
movcv_cogs_sales_t 0.00496** -0.000953
(0.00227) (0.00134)
movcv_nibl_sales -5.01e-06* -1.75e-06
(3.01e-06) (1.74e-06)
movcv_nibl_sales_t 2.98e-07 1.19e-07
(2.03e-07) (1.23e-07)
movcv_tobin_q -0.0828*** 0.113***
(0.0160) (0.0104)
movcv_tobin_q_t 0.00643*** -0.0113***
(0.00158) (0.00108)
Constant -0.272*** -0.301*** -0.298*** -0.318*** -0.266*** -0.148*** -0.0825*** -0.0783*** -0.0897*** -0.129***
(0.0365) (0.0346) (0.0358) (0.0347) (0.0362) (0.0281) (0.0270) (0.0280) (0.0269) (0.0271)
Number of observations 57,959 56,244 55,719 57,725 55,057 58,687 56,920 56,393 58,443 55,611
R-squared 0.290 0.288 0.295 0.290 0.289 0.476 0.476 0.483 0.475 0.481
Number of firms 7,572 7,108 7,129 7,494 6,991 7,629 7,162 7,183 7,550 7,032
Each column of Table 6, reports the regression results corresponding to one measure of volatility. In Panel A the dependent variable is Excess Savings, in Panel B the dependent variable is Gross Capital Formation. Each
column reports the coefficient estimates for the trend, our control variables, the measure of volatility and the interaction term between this measure and the trend. Our control variables are a dummy variable indicating an
aggregate contraction of private investment in the country where the firm is based during year t (Dummy Recession), total and current debt variation between the periods t and t-1, and the lagged values of the ratio of
Total Liabilities/Total Assets (leverage), the Current Liabilities/Total Assets ratio (clta), the Cash & Short Term Investment/Total Assets ratio (liquidity_demand), and the Non-Operating Assets/Total Assets ratio
(assets_nonop). The measures of volatility used are the moving coefficients of variation of Net Sales (movcv_net_sales), sales growth (movcv_sales_growth), the Cost of Goods Sold/Net Sales ratio (movcv_cogs_sales),
the Net Income/Net Sales ratio (movcv_nibl_sales), and the Tobin Q (movcv_tobin_q). Standard deviation robust to clustering by firm are reported between brackets. *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5 y 1%
level respectively.
Table 6
The effects of volatility on Excess Savings
Fixed-effects model by firm
Panel A
Dependent Variable: Excess Savings
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Gross Capital Formation
Independent Variables
Trend 0.00152*** 0.000917** 0.00227*** -0.00185*** -0.00156*** -0.000943***
(0.000221) (0.000395) (0.000383) (0.000173) (0.000315) (0.000274)
Dummy Recession 0.00870*** 0.00814*** 0.0113*** -0.0107*** -0.0134*** -0.0117***
(0.00152) (0.00155) (0.00245) (0.00116) (0.00121) (0.00182)
logAT 0.0249*** 0.0277*** 0.0355*** 0.00362** 0.00394** -0.00304
(0.00242) (0.00235) (0.00456) (0.00175) (0.00179) (0.00270)
L.leverage -0.0509*** -0.0563*** -0.0436*** 0.0478*** 0.0552*** 0.0543***
(0.00980) (0.0101) (0.0139) (0.00668) (0.00731) (0.00991)
L.clta -0.0349*** -0.0288** -0.0501*** 0.117*** 0.125*** 0.163***
(0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0165) (0.00901) (0.00961) (0.0140)
L.liquidity_demand -0.334*** -0.331*** -0.382*** 0.291*** 0.303*** 0.331***
(0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0205) (0.00833) (0.00861) (0.0121)
L.assets_nonop -0.224*** -0.225*** -0.331*** 0.141*** 0.150*** 0.198***
(0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0186) (0.00822) (0.00877) (0.0121)
total_debt_variation -0.471*** -0.475*** -0.446*** 0.358*** 0.393*** 0.361***
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0159) (0.00901) (0.00952) (0.0129)
current_debt_variation -0.128*** -0.122*** -0.157*** 0.207*** 0.224*** 0.264***
(0.0120) (0.0122) (0.0174) (0.0111) (0.0119) (0.0165)
sales_growth -0.0376*** 0.103***
(0.00913) (0.00825)
sales_growth_t 0.00454*** -0.00284***
(0.000860) (0.000735)
tobin_q -0.00568** 0.00644***
(0.00247) (0.00229)
tobin_q_t 0.000737** -0.000285
(0.000305) (0.000223)
rd -0.750*** -0.00264
(0.183) (0.0706)
rd_t 0.0257** -0.0138**
(0.0105) (0.00544)
Constant -0.269*** -0.306*** -0.433*** -0.129*** -0.146*** -0.0624
(0.0354) (0.0348) (0.0732) (0.0260) (0.0275) (0.0439)
Number of observations 60,589 59,676 30,729 61,422 60,419 30,992
R-squared 0.294 0.293 0.365 0.499 0.476 0.486
Number of firms 8,393 8,283 4,422 8,467 8,352 4,439
Each column of Table 7, reports the regression results corresponding to one measure of growth. In Panel A the dependent variable is Excess Savings, in
Panel B the dependent variable is Gross Capital Formation. Each column reports the coefficient estimates for the trend, our control variables, the measure of
growth and the interaction term between this measure and the trend. Our control variables are a dummy variable indicating an aggregate contraction of
private investment in the country where the firm is based during year t (Dummy Recession), total and current debt variation between the periods t and t-1,
and the lagged values of the ratio of Total Liabilities/Total Assets (leverage), the Current Liabilities/Total Assets ratio (clta), the Cash & Short Term
Investment/Total Assets ratio (liquidity_demand), and the Non-Operating Assets/Total Assets ratio (assets_nonop). The measures of growth used are the first 
Table 7
The effects of growth on Excess Savings
Fixed-effects model by firm
Panel A
Dependent Variable: Excess Savings
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Gross Capital 
Formation
Figure 1
The main variables during 1997-2010 for the whole sample
Excess Savings, Gross Savings, Gross Capital Formation, Non-Operating Assets, Leverage, and Liquidity Holdings, during the
period 1997-2010, according to median and asset-weighted average, for the sample of manufacturing firms from France,
Germany, Italy, Japan and United Kingdom. 
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Figure 2
Excess Savings
Financially constrained vs. Financially unconstrained firms
Figure 2 shows the evolution of Excess Savings for firms facing more financial constraints (decile 8, 9, and 10) and those
facing less financial constraints (decile 1, 2, and 3). Firms were separated into deciles according to the value of the Whited-Wu
Index, and then the average Excess Savings was computed for each year by decile.
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Figure 3
Excess Savings
Volatile vs. Non-volatile firms
Figure 3 shows the evolution of Excess Savings for firms facing a more volatile environment (decile 8, 9, and 10) and those
facing a less volatile environment (decile 1, 2, and 3). Firms were separated into deciles according to the value of the variation
coefficient of Tobin's Q, and then the average Excess Savings was computed for each year by decile.
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Figure 4
Sales growth rate, Excess Savings, and Gross Capital Formation
High-growth vs Low-growth firms
Figure 4 shows the evolution of Sales Growth, Excess Savings, and Gross Capital Formation, for high-growth
firms (decile 8, 9, and 10) and low-growth firms (decile 1, 2, and 3). Firms were separated into deciles
according to its mean sales growth rate during the sample period, and then the average Sales Growth rate,
Excess Savings, and Gross Capital Formation were computed for each year by decile.
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Appendix Figure 1A - France
The main variables during 1997-2010 for firms from France
Excess Savings, Gross Savings, Gross Capital Formation, Non-Operating Assets, Leverage, and Liquidity Holdings, during the 
period 1997-2010, according to median and asset-weighted average, for the sample of manufacturing firms from France.
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Appendix Figure 1B - Germany
The main variables during 1997-2010 for firms from Germany
Excess Savings, Gross Savings, Gross Capital Formation, Non-Operating Assets, Leverage, and Liquidity Holdings, during the 
period 1997-2010, according to median and asset-weighted average, for the sample of manufacturing firms from Germany.
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Appendix Figure 1C - Italy
The main variables during 1997-2010 for firms from Italy
Excess Savings, Gross Savings, Gross Capital Formation, Non-Operating Assets, Leverage, and Liquidity Holdings, during the 
period 1997-2010, according to median and asset-weighted average, for the sample of manufacturing firms from Italy.
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Appendix Figure 1D - Japan
The main variables during 1997-2010 for firms from Japan
Excess Savings, Gross Savings, Gross Capital Formation, Non-Operating Assets, Leverage, and Liquidity Holdings, during the 
period 1997-2010, according to median and asset-weighted average, for the sample of manufacturing firms from Japan.
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Appendix Figure 1E - United Kingdom
The main variables during 1997-2010 for firms from United Kingdom
Excess Savings, Gross Savings, Gross Capital Formation, Non-Operating Assets, Leverage, and Liquidity Holdings, during the 
period 1997-2010, according to median and asset-weighted average, for the sample of manufacturing firms from United 
Kingdom. 
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